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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
As provided by statute, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this 
matter resulting in this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(3)(j). These 
issues were addressed in the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
ISSUE NUMBER 1. : Did the district court err in determining that 
Defendant Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company ("Freddie Mac") is not liable 
in equity to Plaintiff McKay Dee Credit Union ("McKay Dee") for unjust 
enrichment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard for review for this matter is that the appellate court should 
give no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review the legal 
conclusion reached by the trial court for correctness. The factual findings of the 
trial court are reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard. See, Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 
P.2dl234, 1244 (Utah 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
ARE DETERMINATIVE 
None. 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATIVE 
None. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
McKay Dee was the holder of a deed of trust for certain real property (the 
"Property") to secure a loan in the amount of $30,000.00. Said obligation was 
junior to a deed of trust in the amount of $175,000.00 which was eventually 
assigned to Freddie Mac. At all times the Property was worth more than the value 
of the said debts. In April of 2001, McKay Dee received a notice of trustee's ale 
from the first lienholder that the Property would be sold at trustee's sale on May 
15, 2001. McKay Dee contacted a phone representative whish was identified in 
the notice of trustee's sale, to ascertain the status of the May 15, 2001 sale. 
McKay Dee was advised that the sale had been postponed until May 18, 2001 to 
be held at the same time and same location. 
McKay Dee prepared itself to defend its position by issuing a check in 
preparation to attend the trustee's sale and bid on the Property. McKay Dee 
attended the postponed sale on May 18, 2001, and when nobody else attended 
McKay Dee believed that the debtors had reinstated their mortgage with the first 
lienholder as they had on several other occasions prior to this time. This was 
further confirmed by the fact that the debtors continued to make their payments to 
McKay Dee, continued living in the Property, and informed McKay Dee that they 
had re-instated at that time. The debtors discontinued making monthly payments 
to McKay Dee in June 2003 and McKay Dee subsequently found out that the 
trustee's sale had apparently occurred May 17, 2001, one day earlier than the time 
that the sales line had informed McKay Dee that the sale was going to take place. 
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McKay Dee brought an action against Freddie Mac for unjust enrichment. 
R. 1-6. The trial court was unwilling to impose liability on Freddie Mac. R. 271. 
Furthermore, the trial court found that McKay Dee had not conferred a benefit 
upon Freddie Mac and therefore could not prevail on its unjust enrichment claim. 
R. 271-72. McKay Dee believes that the Second District Court was in error. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 22, 1996, McKay Dee extended a home equity line of credit to 
David R. and Julie S. Call (the "Calls") not to exceed $30,000.00. R. 203. 
2. McKay Dee received from the Calls a deed of trust in return for the above 
loan. R. 203. 
3. Said obligation was junior to a deed of trust in favor of the Bank of Utah 
issued in February of 1996 in the amount of $175,000.00. R. 203. 
4. McKay Dee accepted the deed of trust because they were informed that the 
Property had sufficient equity to protect its interest. R. 203. 
5. At the time that McKay Dee extended its loan, the Property was worth 
approximately.$287,000.00 according to the information and appraisals provided 
to McKay Dee Credit Union. R. 203. 
6. At the same time that McKay Dee extended the loan it also recorded a 
Request for Notice which entitled it to any notice of any action on senior 
encumbrances. R. 203. 
7. The Bank of Utah loan was assigned to Wells Fargo Bank in April of 1998. 
R. 204. 
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8. Wells Fargo Bank later assigned said obligations to GMAC in July of 1998. 
R.204. 
9. The Calls struggled in making their payments to the first lien holder and a 
notice of default was recorded on June 17, 1999 but was later canceled on 
September 7, 1999. Again, a new notice of default was recorded against the Calls 
with regard to the first mortgage as of January 12, 2000, which was once again 
canceled on April 26, 2000. R. 204. 
10. A third notice of default on the Property was recorded on August 8, 2000 
by the Defendant or its representative. R. 204. 
11. A sale was scheduled for December of 2000 and McKay Dee intended to 
bid at that sale to protect its position. However, the Calls apparently made 
reinstatement arrangements prior to that sale being accomplished. R. 204. 
12. In April of 2001, McKay Dee received again a notice of trustee's sale from 
the first lienholder that the Property would be sold at trustee's sale on May 15, 
2001. R.204. 
13. McKay Dee prepared itself to defend its position by issuing a check in 
preparation to attend that trustee's sale and bid on the Property. R. 205. 
14. When McKay Dee called the sales line, provided for in the notice of 
trustee's sale, to ascertain the status of the May 15, 2001 sale McKay Dee was 
advised that the sale had been postponed until May 18, 2001 to be held at the same 
time and same location. R. 205. 
15. On or about May 17, 2001, GMAC assigned the first deed to Freddie Mac. 
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16. McKay Dee attended the postponed sale on May 18, 2001, and when 
nobody else attended McKay Dee believed that the debtors had once again 
reinstated their mortgage with the first lienholder as they had each prior time. 
This was further confirmed by the fact that the Calls continued to make their 
payments to McKay Dee, continued living in the Property, and informed McKay 
Dee that they had re-instated at that time. R. 205. 
17. The Calls discontinued making monthly payments to McKay Dee in June 
2003 and McKay Dee subsequently found out that the trustee's sale had apparently 
occurred May 17, 2001, one day earlier than the time that the sales line had 
informed McKay Dee that the sale was going to take place. R. 205. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In reaching its conclusion that it was unwilling to impose liability on 
Freddie Mac the trial court made the following finding of fact, "[i]t is not clear to 
this Court if Mr. Shirra (Vice-President of McKay Dee) wrote the wrong sale date 
down, or if GMAC provided the wrong date." R. 271. However, upon a closer 
examination of Mr. Shirra's recorded testimony and the other evidence before the 
trial court this finding of fact by the trial court is erroneous. Therefore, the trial 
court should have imposed liability upon Defendants. 
Furthermore, in reasonably relying upon the information provided to them 
about the postponement of the trustee's sale McKay Dee was unable to defend its 
trust deed position and Freddie Mac was able to purchase the Property as the only 
bidder for the amount of $183,344.61. R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 7. By its 
9 
own admission Freddie Mac was able to then sell the Property for the approximate 
amount of $269,900.00. R. 128. Therefore, the benefit conferred upon Freddie 
Mac was at least the profit of $86,555.39 that they received in selling the Property. 
Freddie Mac had an appreciation or knowledge of the benefit received from 
McKay Dee and Freddie Mac's retention of the benefit under the circumstances 
surrounding the apparent trustee's sale would be inequitable without payment to 
McKay Dee for the amount due to it. Therefore, the trial court erred in not 
granting McKay Dee's unjust enrichment claim. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BECAUSE IT WAS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS TO CONCLUDE THAT MCKAY DEE HAD NOT 
BEEN GIVEN THE WRONG DATE OF THE TRUSTEE'S SALE. 
Utah law is clear that a trustee's foreclosure sale is void when a defect or 
irregularity, "would have the effect of chilling the bidding and causing an 
inadequacy of the price". Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Services, Inc., 743 
P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987). Concepts and its progeny, i.e. Timm v. Dewsnup, 
86 P.3d 699 (Utah 2003), and Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings Bank v. Mehr, 
791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990), arise from circumstances where trustee's sales 
were conducted with a valid notice of default, but an alleged irregularity in either: 
1) a defect in the notice of sale itself (Concepts), 2) the timing of the notice of sale 
(Occidental), or the service of the notice of sale (Timm). Therefore, in this case 
the trial court should have imposed liability upon Freddie Mac if it concluded that 
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McKay Dee had received the wrong date for the trustee's sale because such an 
irregularity "would have the effect of chilling the bidding and causing an 
inadequacy of the price." Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1159. 
In reaching its conclusion that it was unwilling to impose liability on 
Freddie Mac the trial court made the following finding of fact, "[i]t is not clear to 
this Court if Mr. Shirra (Vice-President of McKay Dee) wrote the wrong sale date 
down, or if GMAC provided the wrong date." R. 271. A close examination of 
Mr. Shirra's recorded testimony and the other evidence before the trial court 
demonstrates that this finding of fact was clearly erroneous. 
Mr. Shirra testified that he called the sales line provided for in the notice of 
trustee's sale, to ascertain the status of the May 15, 2001 sale. R. 303, Bench Trial 
Transcript p. 41. "I was given the date that the sale was rescheduled for 5/18, May 
the 18 , which is three days later." R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 41. This 
testimony is consistent with the testimony Mr. Shirra gave in his affidavit. R. 141. 
It is also consistent with the testimony he gave during his deposition. R. 244. 
Furthermore, Mr. Shirra's testimony is supported by the Notice of Sale. R. 192. 
Mr. Shirra testified that while listening to the message on the sales line he circled 
the date 5/15/2001 and then drew a line out to the side where he wrote the new 
date 5/18/2001. R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 41. Also, Mr. Shirra's 
testimony is strengthened by the fact that he had a check prepared, R. 198, and 
attended the postponed sale on May 18, 2001. R. 205. 
Freddie Mac has never presented any evidence to contradict Mr. Shirra's 
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testimony. In fact it should be noted that Freddie Mac's only defense to this 
pivotal fact is the disclaimer notice given at the beginning of the sales line 
recording, a defense that the trial court concluded to be wholly insupportable. R. 
303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 114. Thus, in reaching its finding that it was not 
convinced that McKay Dee had been given the wrong date for the trustee's sale 
the only evidence that the trial court relied on was the evidence presented above 
along with Mr. Shirra's cross examination testimony. R. 271. 
During cross examination Mr. Shirra was asked about the Notice of Sale 
with the handwriting indicating the sale date of May 18th, 2001. R. 303, Bench 
Trial Transcript p. 54. He again testified that this was his handwriting. R. 303, 
Bench Trial Transcript p. 54. He was then asked, "[i]s it possible that you could 
have written down the incorrect date for the sale?" R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript 
p. 54. He responded by again saying, "I wrote that down and so I got it from the 
sale line." R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 54. It was only after being pressed 
on the issue by Freddie Mac's counsel several times that Mr. Shirra indicated, 
"[t]here is that possibility." "The same as the possibility of them having the 
wrong date." R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 54. The fact that Mr. Shirra stated 
a possibility does not go to the weight or to the credibility of his testimony. 
Taking this testimony together with all of Mr. Shirra's other testimony and 
all the evidence before the trial court it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to 
conclude that McKay Dee was not given the wrong date for the trustee's sale. 
Therefore, the trial court should have imposed liability upon Freddie Mac because 
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McKay Dee had been given the wrong date for the trustee's sale and that is the 
type of irregularity that, "would have the effect of chilling the bidding and causing 
an inadequacy of the price.'5 Id. 
II. MCKAY DEE'S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM SHOULD NOT 
HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE MCKAY DEE CONFERRED 
A KNOWN BENEFIT UPON THE DEFENDANTS WHICH IF THEY 
RETAIN WHOULD BE WHOLLY INEQUITABLE. 
The facts underlying an unjust enrichment claim are often complex and 
vary greatly from case to case. Allen v. Hall 565 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 2006), 
Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto. Inc., 12 P.3d 580 (Utah 2000), Jeffs v. Stubbs, 
970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998). Indeed, by its very nature, the unjust enrichment 
doctrine developed to handle fact situations, like the one present in this case, that 
do not fit within a particular legal standard but which nonetheless merit judicial 
intervention. Id., see also Restatement of Restitution, intro. n. (1937) (noting that 
narrow early common law causes of actions posed difficulties and required 
creation of chancery courts because "there were many situations in which one 
justly entitled to recover was not able to do so"). While the unjust enrichment 
doctrine has ancient roots, and courts have had a great deal of opportunity to apply 
it, the court's ability to state clearly the outcome-determinative factors remains 
elusive. Id However, the rationale for granting equitable relief is that as a matter 
of reason and justice from the acts and conduct of the parties and circumstances 
surrounding a transaction, restitution need be provided for the purpose of bringing 
about justice. IdL 
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For example in the Jeffs case the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial 
courts ruling that individuals who built improvements on land located in Hildale, 
Utah which they did not even own because the property was held in trust by the 
United Effort Plan Trust ("the UEP") were able to recover for unjust enrichment. 
Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1248. The trial court held that even though the individuals 
intended to benefit and would benefit from the improvements by occupying the 
property during their lifetimes, the individuals' services still conferred a direct, not 
incidental, benefit on the UEP and thus they were able to recover for them. Id. 
The Jeffs case is instructive that the cause of action of unjust enrichment is 
equitable in nature and should be broadly construed. The trial court rigidly 
applied the elements of unjust enrichment without looking at the broad picture. 
McKay Dee's nonattendance at the trustee's sale was unfairly induced by 
Defendants with inaccurate information. The non-attendance at the sale benefited 
Freddie Mac abundantly. Had McKay Dee been provided with accurate 
information, it would have attended the sale, and McKay Dee would have at least 
received the amount owed on the underlying note, if not more because the 
property was worth so much more. Instead, Freddie Mac received a huge unjust 
enrichment from McKay Dee Credit Union. 
In Utah a party may prevail on an unjust enrichment theory by proving 
three elements: "(I) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an 
appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance 
or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it 
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inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value." 
American Towers Owners Assoc, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical 930 P.2d 1182, 1192-
93 (1996). Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money 
or benefits which injustice and equity belong to another. Id, 
The trial court found that McKay Dee had not conferred a benefit upon 
Freddie Mac and therefore could not prevail on its unjust enrichment claim. R. 
271-72. However, when looking at all the facts presented to the trial court its 
conclusion is not correct. 
A. MCKAY DEE CONFERRED A BENEFIT UPON FREDDIE 
MAC. 
In this case McKay Dee conferred a benefit upon Freddie Mac by not 
attending the trustee's sale which apparently occurred May 17, 2001. R. 205. In 
April of 2001, McKay Dee received a notice of trustee's sale from the first 
lienholder that the Property would be sold at trustee's sale on May 15? 2001. R. 
204. McKay Dee prepared itself to defend its position by issuing a check in 
preparation to attend the trustee's sale and bid on the Property. R. 204. When 
McKay Dee called the sales line, provided for in the notice of trustee's sale, to 
ascertain the status of the May 15, 2001 sale McKay Dee was advised that the sale 
had been postponed until May 18, 2001 to be held at the same time and same 
location. R. 205. Again, McKay Dee prepared itself to defend its position by 
issuing a check and attending the postponed sale on May 18, 2001. R. 205. 
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In reasonably relying upon the information provided to them about the 
postponement of the trustee's sale McKay Dee was unable to defend its position 
and Freddie Mac was able to purchase the Property as the only bidder for the 
amount of $183,344.61. R. 303 Bench Trial Transcript p. 7. By its own 
admission Freddie Mac was able to then sell the Property for the approximate 
amount of $269,900.00. R. 128. Therefore, the benefit conferred upon Freddie 
Mac was the profit of $86,555.39 that Freddie Mac received in selling the 
Property. 
B. FREDDIE MAC HAD APPRECIATION OR KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE BENEFIT RECEIVED FROM MCKAY DEE. 
At the same time that McKay Dee extended the loan to the Calls it also 
recorded a Request for Notice which entitled it to any notice of any action on 
senior encumbrances. R. 203. McKay Dee received the previous notice of 
defaults recorded on June 17, 1999, January 12, 2000, and August 8, 2000 as well 
as the notice of trustee's sale in April of 2001. R. 204. By its own admissions 
Freddie Mac knew that the Property would most likely be sold to a third party 
because there was significant equity in it. R. 241. Therefore, Freddie Mac had an 
appreciation or knowledge of the benefit received from McKay Dee's not 
attending the apparent trustee's sale. Morever, McKay Dee's failure to attend the 
sale was induced by Freddie Mac. 
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C. THE RETENTION BY FREDDIE MAC OF THE BENEFIT 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE 
APPARENT TRUSTEE'S SALE WOULD BE INEQUITABLE 
WITHOUT PAYMENT TO MCKAY DEE. 
McKay Dee extended the loan in good faith, attempted to defend its second 
lien position in good faith, received payments from the customers for two years 
beyond the date that the property was sold and has now been left with a deficiency 
plus after accruing interest and has accrued attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
bringing its action. On the other hand Freddie Mac was able to purchase the 
Property as the only bidder for the amount of $183,344.61 and then by their own 
admission were able to sell it for the approximate amount of $269,900.00 leaving 
them with a profit of $86,555.39. To permit Freddie Mac to retain the benefit and 
value received from McKay Dee in regard to the windfall from the sale of the 
Property without compensating McKay Dee would result in an unjust enrichment 
of Freddie Mac, at the expense of McKay Dee, which unjust enrichment should
 4 
not be allowed. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, while the circumstances of this case are somewhat unique the 
remedy of unjust enrichment is not confined to any particular circumstance or set 
of facts. It is, rather, a flexible, equitable remedy to be applied when the court 
finds that "the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties 
of natural justice and equity" to make compensation for benefits received. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that Freddie Mac is not liable in equity to 
17 
Plaintiff McKay Dee for unjust enrichment because McKay Dee conferred a 
known benefit upon Freddie Mac which if they are allowed to retain would be 
wholly inequitable. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTEDAis _S_ day o^November, 2007 
M. Darin Hammond 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISISON A 
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fcJi, IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL D ^ ^ € T l C G t J & T , STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
MCKAY DEE CREDIT UNION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GMAC MORTGAGE CORPORATION and 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 
CORP., et al, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 040901626 
Ernie W. Jones 
District Judge 
F£B 1 3 2001 
This matter came on for trial on January 18, 2007 before the Honorable Ernie Jones. The 
Plaintiff was represented by Attorney Darin Hammond. The Defendant was represented by 
Attorney Brad DeHaan. 
The Court, having heard the testimony and arguments of counsel, and having reviewed 
the exhibits, rules as follows: 
I. The Wrong Date for Foreclosure: 
1. The mortage foreclosure was originally set for May 15, 2001. McKay Dee Credit 
Union personnel believed the sale was moved to May 18, 2001. Mr. Shirra, Vice President of 
McKay Dee Credit Union, called the sale telephone line and wrote down May 18, 2001 on the 
notice. (See exhibit PI2). 
Page 1 o f 4 Memorandum decision (from trial 
VD19461865 o* 
2. Mr. Shirra testified that he thought the date of the sale was May 18, 2001, but admitted 
on cross-examination that it was possible he wrote the wrong date down. 
3. The foreclosure sale was actually held on May 17, 2001. 
4. The Plaintiff has the burden of proof in this case. 
5. Based on the testimony, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiff has met the burden of 
proof. The issue is whether G.M.A.C. gave the Plaintiff the wrong date, or whether Mr. Shirra 
wrote down the wrong sale date. 
6. It is not clear to the Court if Mr. Shirra wrote the wrong date for the sale down, or if 
G.M.A.C. provided the wrong date. 
7. Since the Plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of proof, the Court is unwilling to 
impose liability on the Defendant for the error. 
II. Unjust Enrichment Claim: 
8. Plaintiff seeks relief on grounds of unjust enrichment to Plaintiffs detriment. 
9. Three elements must be present for unjust enrichment: 
a) there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another; 
b) the second and third elements are not relevant to this issue. 
10. In this case, Plaintiff claims Defendant received a windfall in excess of $25,000 and 
that Plaintiff conferred this benefit on Defendants. 
11. The Court finds the Plaintiff conferred no benefit on Defendant. Plaintiff did not pay 
money or provide any benefit directly to Defendant. 
12. Any benefit received by Defendant was conferred by Defendant's own effort in 
completing the foreclosure sale. 
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exists to support its claim for unjust enrichment. 
14. Plaintiff cannot recover under a theory of unjust enrichment against the Defendant. 
HI Damages: 
15. Plaintiff claims it is entitled to the excess sale proceeds from the sale of the property. 
16. The Court finds it is speculation on the part of the Plaintiff that Plaintiff would have 
received any excess proceeds. 
17. There is no way to determine if Plaintiff would have prevailed at the sale in any event. 
18. While it is unfortunate that the Credit Union lost the opportunity to bid on the 
property, there is no way to determine if they would have been the successful bidder. 
19. It is speculation to say the Credit Union would have prevailed at the sale. 
20. There is no doubt the Credit Union was prepared to bid, but this only amounts to a 
lost opportunity. There is no unjust enrichment, only a lost opportunity to bid on the property. 
21. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to prove its case. The Court enters 
judgment in favor of the Defendant, for no cause of action. 
22. Defendant will prepare an order consistent with this decision for signature and entry. 
Dated this ? of f^4^' 2007. 
ERNfe JONES 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE' 
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I date or was he given the wrong date and that's, again, I'm 
fy trying to figure out how I, you know, because I mean I felt 
3 like he was extremely honest in his testimony. But to me 
4 that is a big, big issue in this case is was he given the 
5 wrong date or did he just write down the wrong date and so 
6 your assessment of his testimony is what? That he was given 
7 the wrong date? 
8 MR. HAMMOND: That he was given the wrong date. 
9 That, that's what he said that the phone line provided to him 
10 that date and the second element, the second prong of his 
11 testimony that he [inaudible] wrote that down and that was 
12 what his best recollection was and I agree that he was trying 
13 to forthright with the Court. 
14 MR. DEHAAN: Can I address that, Your Honor? 
15 THE COURT: Yes. 
16 MR. DEHAAN: I've got some issues a little bit with 
17 Mr. Shirra's testimony. He initially gets on the stand and 
18 says I attended the trustee sale. But in his deposition 
19 there are numerous instances where he asserts that he has no 
20 recollection of attending the sale. So I believe that raises 
21 an issue of reliability. 
22 And secondly, he testified that he could have 
23 written down the incorrect date; that it's possible that he 
24 wrote down the incorrect date. That date was not provided 
25 by, by the defendants or by the trustee. That's a date that 
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1 he wrote down on a trustee's deed. Even if he was given that 
2 date by the sale line, the sale line has a major disclaimer 
3 that says this information -
1 THE COURT: Yeah, I know that. 
5 MR. DEHAAN: - is inaccurate. 
6 THE COURT: That, that whole concept just hits me 
7 wrong. That, that you can call the number and they can give 
8 you information and oh, by the way, we may give you the wrong 
9 information. So don't rely upon this. I mean that, that's, 
10 to me that's crap. To be able to make some kind of 
11 disclaimer when you're calling to find out, you know, when's 
12 this sale going to take place. I mean to me if he called and 
13 somebody on the other end told him it was the 18th, then I 
14 think they're going to be responsible for that. But what I'm 
15 struggling with, and I know that you make this disclaimer and 
16 I think that why bother even having a, having a recording or 
17 having anybody on the other end. It's like saying, well, 
18 here's the date. But by the way, it may not be reliable. It 
19 may not mean anything and you can't hold us to it. I mean 
20 the whole concept of the disclaimer is troubling to me. But 
21 putting that aside, what I'm trying to figure out is did 
22 somebody on the other end tell him the 18th. I think that's 
23 critical to this case and I just can't figure out whether he 
24 wrote the wrong date down or whether somebody gave him the 
25 18th. 
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1 MR, DEHAAN: I understand your concern. I 
2 understand the troubling aspect of the disclaimer. I suppose 
3 that's an issue of whether disclaimers should be provided or 
4 not in a general sense. In this case I do assert that Mr. 
5 Shirra's testimony is unreliable. He did testify that he 
6 could have written down the wrong date; that the date was 
7 provided, or he came up with that date. It wasn't a date 
8 provided by the defendants or by the trustee that [inaudible] 
9 itself. 
10 THE COURT: But where else would he have come up 
11 with the date. It makes more sense that somebody gave him 
12 the date than it does that he made a mistake. But I'm not 
13 sure that's what happened here. I'm just trying to figure 
14 out. I mean, you know, to me, he's sitting there. He's got 
15 the notice. He makes the phone call, and then he circles the 
16 date the 15th and then writes 5/18/01 out to the side. To me 
17 that's pretty credible. But when he said it's possible that 
16 I wrote down the wrong date. That, that caused me some 
19 concern and so I, that's what I'm trying to figure out. Was 
20 he given the 18th, or did he make a mistake and write down 
21 the 18th? 
22 MR. DEHAAN: I write down incorrect dates and 
23 things all the time, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: I know, so do I. 
25 MR. DEHAAN: But even with that, I still would 
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1 assert that the code provides that everything was complied 
2 with, that the trustee's -
3 THE COURT: Well, I know what all the documents say. 
4 MR. DEHAAN: Okay. 
5 THE COURT: And I know there was a mistake made here 
6 by somebody, you know, and that's what I'm trying to figure 
7 out. If McKay Dee just made a mistake and wrote down the 
8 wrong date. But you know what's so frustrating about this 
9 case is this property was up for sale and it was cancelled 
10 and we went through the same process over and over and over 
11 again and so I can see where they're coming from thinking, 
12 oh, it's been cancelled again. But I think it makes a big 
13 difference to know where that, the 18th came from. Is it his 
14 mistake, or is the, was it the -
15 MR. HAMMOND: [inaudible] or not. Would the Court 
16 like to ask any more questions of Mr. Shirra? 
17 THE COURT: You know what to me it's critical enough 
18 I, yeah, I wouldn't mind hearing from him again on this 
19 because I, to me the case really to a large extent hinges on 
20 that date. I, in my opinion, it's the number one issue for 
21 me. 
22 Do you have any objection if we put him back on. 
23 MR. DEHAAN: I would object to that, Your Honor. I 
24 think plaintiff rested it's case. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. All right, well I'm not going to 
116 
1 put him back on. I know what his testimony is and I can, I 
2 can read it back, or have it read back. I can get a copy of 
3 the tape. But anyway, what I'm going to do is take this 
4 under advisement. Because I really think that's the, such a 
5 critical part of the case, I think. 
6 The other question I had for Mr. Hammond is a 
7 question of damages. Let's assume that I rule in favor of 
8 McKay Dee and I'm trying to figure out how you assess 
9 damages. Because what it boils down to is, hey, and you know 
10 Mr. Palmer was right. He said we just wanted an opportunity 
11 to bid on the property and they weren't given that 
12 opportunity, for whatever reason. But I don't know how you 
13 assess the damages because aren't we speculating to a certain 
14 extent? In other words, had they both been there, had McKay 
15 Dee been there at the same time that Freddie Mac was there, 
16 we don't know who would have won the bid, do we? So how do 
17 I, how do I calculate damages in a situation like that? 
18 MR. HAMMOND: Well, the best way that I think that 
19 the Court has to calculate that is to look at what McKay Dee 
20 lost, and McKay Dee first [inaudible] lost the entire benefit 
21 of that sale. 
22 THE COURT: Well, I don't have any trouble with the 
23 loan, the 30,000 or 25,000 that they, they put out, but what 
24 I'm getting to is the profit. We know that there was a 
25 profit made from the sale on this property. The 269 less the 
117 
